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More than a Food Fight
Julia A. Moore is a public
policy scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center
for Scholars in Washington, D.C.
If the United States and Europe cannot
settle their disagreements over agricultural biotechnology,
the fallout will extend far beyond the food business.
From some perspectives, the news for agricultural
biotechnology boosters seems good. Latest figures show farmers
sowing genetically modified (GM) crops with a vengeance. Over
half of the U.S. soybean crop, 25 percent of corn, and over
70 percent of cotton output are from GM seed. In 2000, annual
global plantings of transgenic crops exceeded 100 million
acres for the first time: an increase of 11 percent over 1999
and a huge gain over the 4 million acres planted in 1996.
And finally, in February the European Parliament paved the
way for ending Europe's de facto three-year moratorium on
new approvals of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) by
ratifying a revised directive (90/220/EEC) governing their
environmental release and commercialization.
Then why do we hear so much doom and gloom in
the press? Why is the International Herald Tribune
running a page-one story headlined "For Biotech, a Lost
War"? Why are two of Britain's top three food retailers
announcing that their house-brand meat products will be produced
only from animals that do not eat GM feed and that they are
committed to offering non-GM dairy products? And what do we
make of the Clinton administration's secretary of agriculture's
warning to incoming secretary Ann Veneman that GM food will
be her top priority. "Biotechnology is going to be thrust
on her," according to Dan Glickman, "whether she
wants it or not . . . like it was on me, big time."
Veneman's counterpart in Germany is Renate Kunast,
a newly appointed superminister for food, agriculture, and
consumer protection and coleader of the Green Party, who is
determined to steer agriculture "back to nature."
Her views on GM foods are doubtless consistent with those
of fellow Green Party boss and German foreign minister Joschka
Fischer, who recently said: "Europeans do not want genetically
modified food--period. It does not matter what research shows;
they just do not want it and that has to be respected."
Robert Zoellick, President George W. Bush's
new trade representative, will have his hands full. The de
facto moratorium on approval of new GM foods won't be lifted
until after the European Commission formally publishes a whole
raft of legislative proposals that include requirements for
traceability and labeling of GM products; measures that will
take time to develop and that U.S. exporters will find difficult
and costly to meet. And immediately after the Parliament's
vote on directive 90/220, France and five other European Union
(EU) countries issued statements saying they want the moratorium
maintained.
When asked about GM crops during the presidential
campaign, George W. Bush responded that, "The next president
must carry a simple and unequivocal message to foreign governments:
We won't tolerate favoritism and unfair subsidies for your
national industries. I will fight to ensure that U.S. products
are allowed entry into the European Union and that accepted
scientific principles are applied in enacting regulations.
American farmers are without rival in their ability to produce
and compete, and the future prosperity of the U.S. farm sector
depends in large part on the expansion of global markets for
U.S. products."
Before Zoellick's appointment, business and
foreign policy pundits were predicting a major trade collision
between the United States and Europe over beef, bananas, and
"funny plants"; that is, Europe's exclusion of growth
hormone-fed U.S. beef, of bananas produced by American-owned
companies in Latin America, and of GM foods. Disturbingly,
two of these issues hinge on public attitudes toward science
in general and public confidence in government science in
particular.
Science and trade
The establishment of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) in 1995, along with breakneck progress in genomics and
information technology, helped place science squarely at the
center of international economic forums and controversy. WTO
negotiators, afraid that nations would try to circumvent liberalization
with nontariff trade barriers based on bogus health arguments,
created the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary (food
safety and animal and plant health) measures. This SPS Agreement
allows countries to set their own food safety standards but
mandates that these regulations must be science-based and
cannot arbitrarily discriminate against the goods of other
nations.
But the problem arises (as in the case of Europe's
ban on U.S. hormone-treated beef) over whose science is authoritative
and decisive. And what if consumers reject products such as
GM foods even after national government and international
science bodies deem them safe? With trade between the United
States and Europe approaching $450 billion annually, the answers
to these questions are significant ones for the U.S. economy.
How they are resolved also has important implications for
U.S. science and for global development.
The public response to GM foods can be linked
to events that have no direct link to genetic engineering.
Over the past five years, science itself has taken a beating
in Europe. Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), better
known as mad cow disease, is the chief culprit. In 1996, after
eight years of bureaucrats and politicians claiming that mad
cow disease was under control and posed no risk to humans,
British government ministers did a dramatic about-face. They
admitted that eight people in the United Kingdom may have
died from eating BSE-infected cattle. That number has since
risen to 70, and some experts estimate that over the next
30 years, as many as 500,000 people in Britain could die from
the human form of the disease, known as variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob
disease.
Officials conceded that the government failed
to protect livestock and public health. They acknowledged
that the government misled the public and misrepresented what
was known scientifically about BSE. The government then implemented
stringent control measures that resulted in the slaughter
of millions of animals and in economic losses totaling an
estimated $5.5 billion. But the lasting impression left on
the British public is that science failed. According to a
Parliamentary report released in 2000, the U.K. government's
handling of BSE created "a crisis of confidence"
in science and government. It gave rise to a prevailing public
sentiment that is skeptical of all science associated with
government or industry and wary of science whose purpose and
results are not obviously beneficial to them.
Citizens in Britain are now likely to trust
only in science that is seen as "independent." For
them, Greenpeace appears more trustworthy than what the electorate
believes is a secretive and often misleading British government.
Scientific research is viewed as increasingly commercialized,
and the peer review process as not screening out financial
conflicts of interest. These public attitudes are fed by a
British press that often seems more worried about circulation
figures than about quality science reporting. When over one-fifth
of the British public believes that ordinary tomatoes don't
have genes but genetically modified tomatoes do, it doesn't
take much to frighten readers into feeling risk-adverse and
leery of new technologies such as GM food, which many Europeans
refer to as "Frankenfood."
In
late 2000, the BSE crisis hit the Continent, as Dan Glickman
would say, "big time." Increased animal testing
showed almost 200 BSE cases in France, 8 in Germany, and 26
in the Benelux countries. Although these numbers are small
compared to the more than 175,000 BSE cases in Britain, continental
governments were perceived to have misled their publics about
the effectiveness of national detection and prevention schemes
and about the risks of this frightening and insidious disease
spreading to their cattle herds. The press had a field day.
The EU was forced into drastic measures to quell public panic.
At a midnight meeting in Brussels in early December, EU agricultural
ministers agreed to an emergency program to stop the disease's
spread that may cost as much as $6.6 billion. Its key aim
is to repair consumer confidence in Europe's besieged health
and food safety regimes.
But despite EU actions, the consumer crisis
is growing worse. European beef consumption has dropped 27
percent. In Germany it has decreased by half, and a growing
number of nations outside Europe are banning EU beef imports.
All this could drive the cost of mad cow disease safeguards
even higher. Countries are paying an enormous price--politically,
economically, and socially--for this erosion of trust in government
and science.
British Prime Minister Tony Blair, a strong
proponent of biotechnology and a true believer in the importance
of science to Britain's and the world's future, has called
public reaction to biotechnology "hysteria." He
criticized the British media's "orchestrated barrage"
and the "tyranny of pressure groups" for creating
it. Blair recently warned that there is a danger of the United
Kingdom becoming "anti-science." It's a fear shared
and echoed in newspapers, laboratories, boardrooms, and government
offices throughout Europe. In part, this is an understandable
fallout from the mad cow disease crisis. It also is due to
a growing list of debacles, including France's attempts to
cover up its inadequate protection against AIDS-tainted blood
and Belgium's failure to prevent the sale of animal feed contaminated
with polychlorinated biphenyls and furans, which have shattered
popular trust.
Another factor is the liberal governments that
came to power in Britain, Germany, and France in the late
1990s. These new leaders take environmental and consumer concerns
more seriously than did their more conservative predecessors.
In addition, Europe is suffering from the immense growing
pains associated with almost doubling its membership to 27
very different nations over the next three to five years.
Lack of trust in government is a time-honored
tradition in the United States, but in today's fast-moving
technological world, it can be an increasingly costly and
dangerous condition, especially when eroding confidence in
science is added to the mix. European citizens and policymakers
are worried about the state of their regulatory systems. Although
they have accepted new biotech drugs and cellular phones--technologies
with obvious benefits that offset any perceived risk--they
are raising ethical, consumer, environmental, and sustainability
questions about new science and technology with an intensity
not seen in the United States; at least not yet.
Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are playing
an increasingly prominent role in shaping European public
opinion and policy. Responsible consumer, environmental, and
public interest groups, many of which operate in the United
States and developing countries as well as in Europe, are
a force that must be reckoned with. Given the importance of
the U.S./European trade relationship, which is the world's
largest and fastest growing, the new U.S. administration must
pay close attention to the European political climate. It
must recognize from the outset that this is not just a food
fight.
Building trust
This new era of globalization requires a careful
effort designed to build and maintain European consumer confidence
in U.S. science and technology. This demands taking specific
actions, not just "spin." If the United States is
to succeed in the European marketplace, then it must help
shape and embrace public confidence-building measures such
as the still-to-be-defined "precautionary principle,"
which The Economist describes as a "fancy term for a
simple idea: better safe than sorry."
Adoption of such a measure can make good regulatory
sense if the measure is grounded in solid science and public
health principles, if it is based on available scientific
evidence and knowledge, if it is consistent and not arbitrary,
if it recognizes uncertainties, and if it results in actions
proportionate to potential risks. That's a tall order. But
given Europe's current political and public opinion realities,
an extensive and patient effort will be necessary to build
confidence in new U.S. science and technology. If, however,
the precautionary principle becomes the kind of bogus health
dodge that worried early WTO negotiators, it inevitably will
lead to trade battles and a lack of faith in science, which
will benefit no one.
Sometimes industry is quicker than governments
to adapt to new business environments. Thus, if British consumers
are frightened of the risks associated with transferring genes
into crop plants to make them more resistant to pests, but
they support the use of biotechnology in medicine, it makes
simple sense for corporations interested in biotechnology's
acceptance to lead with marketing biotech products that offer
direct health or nutritional benefits and to invest more in
research on potential environmental and health effects. Paul
Drayson, chairman of BioIndustry in Britain, recently gave
medical biotech companies in Europe a wake-up call. He urged
them to engage the public more and warned that "if biotech
is to flourish, the public needs to have confidence in the
safeguards." Even in the largely welcomed area of medical
biotech, he argued, the public needs "to be reassured
that the benefits far outweigh the dangers."
Governments need to fund independent scientific
research that informs health, safety, and environmental policies
and contributes to the improvement of regulatory agencies
responsible for food safety and environmental quality. Increasingly,
U.S. and European regulatory agencies are going to have to
reconcile their rulemaking approaches, a task made immensely
harder by the EU's own difficulties in harmonizing the regulations
and cultures of its 15 member countries. International bodies
such as the United Nations' Food and Agricultural Organization,
the World Health Organization (home of Codex Alimentarius,
WTO's preferred standard-setter for measures facilitating
global trade in food), and the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development also need adequate financial support to enable
them to access the world's best science when they are assessing
the effects of new technologies.
The costs of doing all this are high. For example,
John Losey [a coauthor of the 1999 Cornell University study
that concluded that monarch butterflies are harmed by pollen
from Bt (Bacillus thuringiensis) corn] estimated that
it would cost $2 million to $3 million just to determine the
risk of Bt corn to monarchs. As the New York Times noted,
this is a huge amount to pay to look at "just one risk
from one biotech organism to one species," especially
when the Department of Agriculture's Biotechnology Risk Assessment
Research Grants budget is just over $1 million annually. But
greater research and regulatory expenditures look reasonable
when weighed against annual U.S. food exports of $46 billion
or the price tag of Europe's new BSE protections.
In this contentious political climate, it is
critical for scientists to be more active and effective in
policy debates. We cannot realistically expect the popular
media to change much in Europe or the United States. They
are not likely to improve their science coverage dramatically
or to moderate their sensationalist tendencies or political
biases. Their mission is to gain readership or viewers, not
to teach or promote science. Scientists themselves will have
to take the initiative to raise the quality of discourse and
policymaking.
One positive outcome of the GM debate is a new
sense of urgency among Britain's science establishment about
becoming involved in public outreach and in efforts to improve
science literacy. The Royal Institution recently announced
that it is establishing an independent Science Media Center
to better serve journalists on controversial science and technology
issues. In an attempt to reach beyond traditional audiences,
the British Association for the Advancement of Science now
runs public dialogue sessions on science issues in wine bars
in central London.
With the creation of a new Food Standards Agency
(FSA), scientists in England also are promoting a new kind
of government transparency that is unabashedly aimed at helping
to regain consumer confidence in science's independence and
its dedication to protecting and improving public health.
The government created this new institution to move accountability
for food safety to U.K. health ministers and away from the
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, which in the
wake of Britain's BSE crisis was perceived as a promoter of
industry rather than a protector of consumer interests. FSA
is run by an independent board appointed through open competition.
All the agency's policies are decided in public. All meetings
have public question-and-answer sessions, and all information
from these meetings is available on the Web. All FSA's risk
assessments and recommendations to ministers are made public,
regardless of the final decision made by government political
leaders. For example, FSA published in Nature the risk
assessment behind its highly controversial recommendation
(which the government accepted) not to ban French beef from
British markets after the discovery of increased cases of
BSE in France. FSA made this recommendation even though the
French, contrary to EU rules, still prohibit import of British
beef into France because of BSE concerns.
No short cuts
There is no silver bullet, no one action or
single set of actors that will build greater public confidence
in science in Europe. Government, science, industry, and NGOs
on both continents all have important roles to play. But there
is no going back to what some remember nostalgically as a
simpler time, when the public seemed to have more faith in
science and government and when scientists could work undisturbed
in their labs. Even the now widely heralded Human Genome Project
faced criticism when it was initiated 16 years ago. Nobel
Prize winner James Watson notes in his latest book, A Passion
for DNA, that there was considerable opposition and fear
about the moral, legal, and social consequences of precise
human genetic information. As a result, Watson played a role
in the decision to create a specific program, which now accounts
for 5 percent of the Genome Project's annual budget, to define
and deal with the ethical, legal, and social implications
(ELSI) raised by this brave new world of genetics.
In that same book, Watson regrets the role he
played in calling for the temporary 1974 moratorium on certain
types of DNA experiments and the convening of the landmark
1975 Asilomar Conference, which eventually led to safety guidelines
developed and monitored by the National Institutes of Health.
Watson now believes that rather than reassuring the public,
the moratorium and Asilomar Conference alerted the public
to health and environmental dangers that didn't exist and
gave recombinant DNA doomsayers a credibility they didn't
deserve.
Watson is wrong. The Asilomar action and the
Genome Project's ELSI program offer important lessons about
how science needs to operate in the future. Both are models
of engaging the public in prevention and confidence-building
measures before problems arise. They helped create a more
informed debate and a climate of public trust. These measures
ensured positive U.S. government policy decisions that allowed
the research to continue with federal funding and support.
They helped prevent the hysteria that is plaguing Tony Blair.
When he was director of the National Science
Foundation, former presidential science advisor Neal Lane
spoke passionately about the need for scientists to reach
out to the public and become "civic scientists."
In 1997, Lane said, "We need a routine engagement of
the research community in public dialogue with the electorate
on both the science and the societal context in which it exists.
And this communication is not a one-way process in which the
scientists talk and teach and the public listens and learns.
On the contrary, the research community has as much or more
to learn from the public as it has to offer that public. This
process of dialogue cannot be learned in an overnight primer.
It must be part of our public habit, firmly in place and functioning
with trust on both sides." In that same speech, Lane
went on to say that issues such as cloning expose "the
problems and dangers" of a lack of dialogue between scientists
and the public. GM food is another of those thorny problems,
and the need for science to be engaged, domestically and on
a global scale, is ignored today at science's peril.
Recommended reading
Lord Jenkins, Science and Society (London:
Select Committee on Science and Technology, U.K. Parliament,
February 23, 2000).
U.K. Office of Science and Technology and the
Wellcome Trust, Science and the Public: A Review of Science
Communications and Public Attitudes to Science in Britain
(London: U.K. Office of Science and Technology, October 2000).
John Durant et al., eds., Biotechnology in
the Public Sphere: A European Sourcebook (London: Science
Museum, 1998).
James D. Watson, A Passion for DNA: Genes,
Genomes and Society (Cold Spring Harbor, N.Y.: Cold Spring
Harbor Laboratory Press, 2000).
Lord Phillips, June Bridgeman, and Malcolm Ferguson-Smith,
The BSE Inquiry (London: U.K. House of Commons, October
2000).
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